UIC Law Review
Volume 24

Issue 2

Article 1

Winter 1991

James v. Illinois: Wither the Exclusionary Rule - Not Quite Yet, 24
J. Marshall L. Rev. 493 (1991)
David H. Norris

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth
Amendment Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David H. Norris, James v. Illinois: Wither the Exclusionary Rule - Not Quite Yet, 24 J. Marshall L. Rev. 493
(1991)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/1
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

CASENOTE

JAMES v. ILLINOIS.* WITHER THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE?...
NOT QUITE YET
In James v. Illinois,1 the United States Supreme Court protected the scope and vitality of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule. 2 The James Court addressed the issue whether the
* 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990).
1. 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990).
2. Professor LaFave described the exclusionary rule stating:
Under the Fourth Amendment rule, if a search or seizure in violation of
the Amendment has occurred, then upon timely objection by a defendant
with standing to object the fruits of that illegality must be suppressed and
consequently may not be introduced into evidence in the criminal trial of
that defendant.
4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.6 (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted).
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court initially applied the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, state and
federal officers participated in a warrantless search of the defendant's home
and seized evidence. Id. at 387. The defendant was convicted at trial through
the use of this tainted evidence. Id. at 386. The Court reversed, holding that the
illegally seized evidence was inadmissible in federal criminal prosecutions. Id.
at 398.
In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court held that the fourth
amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures must also apply to state actors through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Wolf Court, however, was unwilling to impose the Weeks remedy of exclusion of evidence at trial, via the exclusionary rule, to state criminal proceedings. Id, at 28. The Court noted that the majority of both states and English
speaking countries did not mandate the exclusion of evidence at trial as the
remedy for illegal searches and seizures. Id. Therefore, the Court deferred to
the state to select and develop their own remedies. Id. at 29.
In 1961, the Court reexamined the application of the exclusionary rule to
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, local police officers
made a warrantless entry into defendant's home and obtained evidence of state
obscenity law violations. Id. at 644-45. Although the Ohio Supreme Court condemned the police actions, it affirmed the defendant's conviction through the
use of the tainted evidence. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 431, 166 N.E.2d 387,
389-90 (1960). The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that illegally
seized evidence must also be excluded from state criminal prosecutions. Mapp,
367 U.S. at 655. The Court reasoned that its decision to disallow the "silver
platter" doctrine in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (federal use of
illegally seized evidence by state actors impermissible), combined with the ineffectiveness or lack of state remedies to fourth amendment violations mandated
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impeachment exceptions3 to the exclusionary rule ("rule") should
the application of the exclusionary rule in state trials to protect privacy interests guaranteed by the fourth amendment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651-54.
For a historical perspective of the exclusionary rule see 1 W. LAFAVE,
supra, at § 1.1. See also Bradley, Present at the Creation?A Critical Guide to
Weeks v. United States and its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1031 (1986). For
examples of the international application of the exclusionary rule see Bradley,
The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1066 (1983) (exclusionary rule applied in Germany); Comment, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 57 TUL. L. REV. 648, 680 (1983)
(exclusionary rule not applied in most foreign legal systems).
3. The United States Supreme Court first created an exception to the exclusionary rule in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). In Walder, the
Court permitted the introduction of illegally seized heroin to impeach the defendant's testimony that he had never possessed narcotics. Id. at 64. The heroin
had been illegally seized in the defendant's arrest two years prior and those
charges were subsequently dismissed. Id. at 62-63. The Court reasoned that the
defendant must be free to deny all the elements of the crime charged but refused to extend the rule to protect him from his own perjurious testimony concerning facts outside those charged. Id. at 65.
The Court addressed a second impeachment exception in Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris,the defendant was arrested for sales of
heroin to undercover police officers and gave an inculpatory statement while in
custody. Id. at 222-23. The statement was suppressed because the officers had
failed to inform the defendant of his rights via Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). Id. The prosecution did not use the suppressed statement in its case in
chief but did use it to impeach the defendant once he testified inconsistently
with that statement. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction reasoning
that the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on future police misconduct was
adequately served by excluding the suppressed evidence from the state's casein-chief. Id. at 225.
Four years later, the Court dealt with a similar situation in Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975). In Hass, the defendant was arrested and informed of his
Miranda rights. Id. at 715-16. The defendant requested counsel but later gave
inculpatory statements to the police without counsel present. Id. The court
suppressed the statement from the state's case-in-chief but permitted its use for
impeachment purposes once the defendant testified inconsistently. Id. at 717.
The Supreme Court affirmed the use of the suppressed statement reasoning
that the deterrent effect on police misconduct was sufficiently advanced by excluding the evidence from the state's main case. Id. at 722-23.
The final exception was created in United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620
(1980). In Havens, the defendant and a friend arrived at Miami airport from
Lima, Peru, and proceeded through customs. Id. at 621. Customs agents
searched the defendant's friend and discovered cocaine sewn into pockets which
were constructed from a T-shirt. Id. at 622. Police officers later illegally
searched the defendant and found the T-shirt used to make the pockets. Id. At
trial, the defendant did not mention the suppressed T-shirt during direct examination but the prosecutor asked him about it in cross-examination. Id. at 622-23.
The trial court permitted the T-shirt to be introduced into evidence to impeach
the defendant's inconsistent testimony during cross-examination. Id. The
Supreme Court affirmed the use of the suppressed evidence, for impeachment
purposes, reasoning that the prosecutor's questions were "within the scope" of
the defendant's direct examination and that prohibiting the evidence from the
state's case in chief would adequately deter future police misconduct. Id. at 62728.
For additional information concerning the development of impeachment
exceptions to the exclusionary rule see generally 4 W. LaFave, supra note 2, at
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be expanded to permit the impeachment 4 of any defense witness
with the suppressed statements of a defendant. The closely divided
Court correctly held that this expansion would be inconsistent with
the underlying purpose of the rule and refused to broaden the rule's
5
exceptions under the facts of the James case.
§ 11.6; Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the ConstitutionalExclusionary Rules, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1476 (1973).

The Court has also carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule, in nonimpeachment contexts, when the prospective deterrent effect on future police
misconduct is minimal. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 347 (1987) (exclusionary
rule inapplicable to evidence obtained pursuant to state statute later found to be
unconstitutional); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (exclusionary rule
inapplicable when police officer relies on invalid warrant in good faith); I.N.S. v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to deportation hearings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (exclusionary rule
inapplicable to federal civil tax proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976) (exclusionary rule inapplicable for federal habeas corpus relief of state
prisoner); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to illegal search of an automobile); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand jury proceedings); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (exclusionary rule inapplicable when
defendant's own fourth amendment rights not violated). See generally Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1365, 1389-92 (1983).
4. Impeachment is the calling into question the credibility of a witness. C.
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 33 (2d ed. 1972). There are five methods to
perfect the impeachment of a witness: (a) prior inconsistent statement of the
witness; (b) bias of the witness; (c) attack the character of the witness; (d) a
defect in the capacity of the witness; and (e) proof by other witnesses that material facts are otherwise than as testified to by the witness sought to be impeached. Id.
The most effective and widely used method of impeachment is through the
use of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness. Id. In People v. James, 123
Ill. 2d 523, 538, 528 N.E.2d 723, 730 (1988), however, the method applied is proof
by other witnesses that material facts are otherwise than as testified to by the
witness sought to be impeached. Thus, the impeachment is perfected, and the
witness is discredited, only if the trier of fact accepts the contradicting testimony as true. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, §§ 1000,
1018 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
5. The United States Supreme Court has stated three different purposes
underlying the exclusionary rule. The first rationale, judicial integrity, is premised on the theory that the judiciary must not: (1) sanction the government's
fourth amendment violations; (2) commit a second fourth amendment violation
by hearing illegally seized evidence; or (3) sanction perjurious testimony. Stewart, supra note 3, at 1382. Justice Holmes first expounded this reasoning in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) and later in Olinstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Judicial integrity continued to form
a basis for majority opinions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (admitting illegally seized evidence at trial legitimizes the illegal conduct), and Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, (1960) (courts must not become accomplices in the
willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold).
Today the judicial integrity rationale is still advanced as an alternative
basis for the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Amicus Curie Brief for the A.C.L.U. at
35-40, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (No. 81-430) (1983) (arguing for revival of
judicial integrity rationale). However, judicial integrity is now generally limited to dissenting opinions, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226-32 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 724-25 (1975) (Brennan,
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On the evening of August 30, 1982, Delbert Collins, Geliria
Boyd and some friends were returning home from a party on Chicago's south side. 6 A group of three teenagers confronted Collins,
Boyd and their friends and demanded money. 7 Delbert Collins reJ., dissenting), and to evidence preclusion in other circumstances. See Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (judicial integrity basis for testimony preclusion).
The second purpose substantiating the rule is premised on the theory that
judicial use of the fruits of governmental action undermines popular trust in
government. 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 1.1. This theory was first stated
in Weeks:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in
the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support
of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to
appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights... To sanction such
proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not
an open defiance of the prohibition of the Constitution, intended for the
protection of the people against such unauthorized action.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-94 (1914). This rationale for the exclusionary rule is today generally limited to dissenting opinions. See, e.g., United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-67 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The third purpose substantiating the exclusionary rule is the deterrent effect on future police misconduct. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme
Court first introduced this rationale in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
stating that "the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring
unreasonable searches." Id. at 31. Later, the Terry Court held that the exclusionary rule's "major thrust is a deterrent one." Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. Eventually the Court's majority opinions rested solely on the purpose of deterrence.
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984) (deterrence rationale
controlling); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-55 (1976) (deterrence rationale controlling); United States Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (deterrence rationale controlling).
The Court's narrowing of the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule
has effectively limited the scope of the rule to only those cases where deterrence is accomplished. White, Forgotten Points in the "ExclusionaryRule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1281 (1983). Therefore, when the rule has only a
"speculative possibility" of deterring police misconduct, an exception is created.
Harris,401 U.S. at 225. In fact, since the single purpose deterrence theory was
first applied in Alderman, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court has only twice held
that an exception to the rule was unwarranted. James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648
(1990); see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) (exclusionary rule applies retroactively to arrests prior to Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
Therefore, the limiting of the purposes underlying the rule has also limited the
application of the rule. See generally, Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis" Rather than an "EmpiricalProposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983).
6. This group of young-men were all friends and called themselves the "B
Boys." People v. James, 123 Ill. 2d 523, 526, 528 N.E.2d 723, 724 (1988).
7. Id. at 525, 528 N.E.2d at 724. Witnesses described one of the trio as being
approximately five feet four inches tall, and the other two offenders were described as being about six feet one inch tall. Id. at 526, 528 N.E.2d at 724. Additionally, the witnesses told the police that all three offenders wore baseball caps
and ski jackets and that the shortest one was the shooter. Id. at 526, 528 N.E.2d
at 724. However, none of the witnesses gave statements to the police concerning
the shooter's hair color or style. Id. at 526, 528 N.E.2d at 724.
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sponded with a smart remark.8 In response, the shortest boy of the
trio pulled a gun and fired several shots into Collins' group striking
two people.9 As a result, Geliria Boyd died from a gunshot wound
to the head and Delbert Collins sustained injuries from a gunshot
wound in the back.10
The next evening, two Chicago detectives went to a beauty parlor during their investigation of the incident." While speaking
with Diane James, the proprietor, they noticed Darryl James, her
fifteen year old son, sitting under a hair dryer. 12 The detectives
took Darryl James into custody placing him in their police car.'3 In
the car, the detectives questioned James about the color and style of
his hair on the previous day. 14 James replied that his hair had been
long, reddish brown and combed back. 15 Later that night, the po16
lice again questioned James, this time at a Chicago police station.
James stated that he had gone to his mother's beauty parlor to have
17
his appearance changed by dying his hair black and curling it.
The State of Illinois indicted Darryl James for murder and attempt murder.' 8 The trial court granted James' motion to suppress
the statements he made to the police.' 9 At trial, Delbert Collins
20
and four other witnesses identified Darryl James as the shooter.
These witnesses also testified that, on the evening of the shooting,
James had long, slicked back, red hair.2 1 At trial, James' hair was
8. Brief for Petitioner at 2, James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct 648 (1990) (No. 886075).
9. James, 123 Ill. 2d at 525, 528 N.E.2d at 724.

10. Id.
11. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 8, at 2. The police arrested an individual based upon a name given by one of the witnesses. Id. This suspect was
subsequently released but not before he gave the police the name of another
possible suspect. Id. This new suspect was brought to the police station but
later released. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Although James was only fifteen years old at the time of his arrest,
a juvenile court judge granted the prosecution's motion to prosecute him as an
adult. Id. at 3.
19. Id. The trial court held that the police officers lacked probable cause to
arrest James and therefore suppressed his statements as fruit of an unlawful
arrest. Id; see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (exclusionary
rule extended to include indirect evidence seized from fourth amendment
violations).
20. James, 123 Ill. 2d at 527, 528 N.E.2d at 724. Each witness identified
James in court although none of the witnesses had informed police of the defendant's alleged hair style or color during the police investigation after the
shooting. Id. at 526-27, 528 N.E.2d at 724.
21. Id. The witnesses testified that they recalled seeing the defendant a few
weeks earlier at the Bud Billiken parade (an annual Afro-american parade on
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black and curly. 22
Darryl James did not testify at trial but two witnesses were
called on his behalf.23 One of them, Ms. Jewell Henderson, a friend
of the James family, testified that on the day of the shooting she
had taken Darryl James to enroll him in high school and at that
time his hair was black. Ms. Henderson's testimony contradicted
the prosecution's witnesses' testimony, as well as James' suppressed
2 4
statement.
The trial court permitted the prosecution to use James' suppressed statements in rebuttal to impeach Ms. Henderson's testimony.25 The jury found Darryl James guilty of both murder and
attempt murder. 26 The court sentenced James to concurrent terms
27
of thirty and fifteen years respectively.
A unanimous panel of the Illinois appellate court reversed
James' conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting the defendant's suppressed statements to impeach Ms. Henderson's testimony. 28 The court noted that prior case law permitted
Chicago's south side) and distinctly remembered seeing him, due to his red
colored "buttered" hairstyle. People v. James, 153 Ill. App. 3d 131, 132, 505

N.E.2d 1118, 1119 (1987).
22. Id. at 132, 505 N.E.2d at 1119.
23. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4. The second witness was a
detective who testified concerning the varying descriptions given by three of the
witnesses. Id. However on surrebuttal, defendant's brother and aunt testified
that defendant's hair had been black and curly for some time, including during
the Bud Billiken parade, a few weeks earlier. Id. at 6.
24. Id. Ms. Henderson also testified that the defendant had watched the
Bud Billiken parade from his mother's beauty parlor; that the defendant had a
reputation for being a non-violent person; and that the defendant had arrived
home between 10:00 and 11:00 P.M. the night of the shooting. Id.
25. James, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 505 N.E.2d at 1120.
26. Id. at 133, 505 N.E.2d at 1118.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 136, 505 N.E.2d at 1121. The appellate court also rejected the
state's contention that the trial court's error in admitting the suppressed statements was harmless. Id. at 135, 505 N.E.2d at 1121. The appellate court acknowledged that there was considerable evidence of James' guilt independent
of his suppressed statement. Id. However, since a major issue in the case was
"identification," and the statements were used to "directly reflect on the issue
of identification", the appellate court held that the error was not harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 136, 505 N.E.2d at 1121.
In addition, the appellate court criticized the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury as to the use of the suppressed statement. Id. at 136, 505
N.E.2d at 1121. The trial court refused two proffered jury instructions limiting
the use of James' statement for the purpose of impeachment. Brief for Respondent at 5, James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648 (No. 88-60750) (1990). The proffered
instructions stated: "Evidence that the defendant made statements following
his arrest may be considered by you only as it may affect the believability of
Jewel Henderson of witnesses. It may not be considered by you as evidence of
the commission of any of the crimes charged." Brief for Petitioner, supra note
8, at 6. Instead, the trial court recited Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.11 (2d ed. 1981) which limited the use of the suppressed statements to
the witness' own prior inconsistent statement. Id. The appellate court con-
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illegally obtained evidence to be used at trial only for the purpose of
impeaching a defendant's testimony 29 but not to impeach a witnesses' testimony as in James.

A closely divided Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court decision holding that James' suppressed statements were

properly admitted to rebut the defense witness' testimony.30 The
court noted that its decision expanded the impeachment exceptions

to the exclusionary rule to include all defense witnesses, but held
that this expansion was consistent with the rationale of prior decisions.3 ' The court reasoned that this expansion was necessary to

cluded that this instruction permitted the suppressed statement to be used as
substantive evidence. James, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 505 N.E.2d at 1121. The
appellate court reasoned that the substantive use of the defendant's suppressed
statement additionally influenced the jury improperly preventing the error
from being harmless. Id. at 135-36, 505 N.E.2d at 1121.
29. Id. at 134, 505 N.E.2d at 1120. The appellate court opined that the prior
impeachment exceptions to the exclusionary rule were permitted to impeach
the defendant upon his testifying because he had taken an affirmative step to
commit perjury while attempting to hide behind the fourth or fifth amendment.
Id. The appellate court reasoned that when a defendant chooses not to testify,
he does not take that affirmative step necessary to deprive him of a constitutional right. Id. at 134, 505 N.E.2d at 1120. This "waiver" theory has been applied by other courts in denying the extension of the impeachment exception to
defense witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Burnett, 637 S.W.2d 680, 690 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc) (waiver theory prevents impeachment of defense witness).
Furthermore, the appellate court warned of the consequences of the extension of the impeachment exception and stated:
We refuse to make such an exception to the exclusionary rule, Were we to
hold otherwise, we would provide little or no deterrence against further
Fourth Amendment violations and the State would be able, under the guise
of impeachment, to use any illegally obtained evidence relevant to the principal issues in the case.
James, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 505 N.E.2d at 1121.
30. People v. James, 123 Ill. 2d 523, 528 N.E.2d 723 (1988). The Illinois
Supreme Court also rejected the petitioner's alternative argument that the
prosecution used the suppressed evidence "substantively" in his closing argument and that this error was not harmless. Id. at 539, 528 N.E.2d at 730-31. The
high court noted that a trial court has discretionary control of closing argument
and that its decision is presumed correct. Id. at 541, 528 N.E.2d at 731. The
court stated that in light of the independent evidence of petitioner's guilt that
any error that the prosecutor committed in closing argument was harmless. Id
31. Id. at 536-37, 528 N.E.2d at 728-29 (1988). The Illinois Supreme Court
acknowledged that while all prior impeachment exceptions only applied to defendants, this fact was not determinative. Id. at 536, 528 N.E.2d at 728-29. The
court held that the "waiver" theory was not controlling. Id. at 536, 528 N.E.2d at
729. For a discussion of the waiver theory, see supra note 29. Instead, the Illinois high court held that the "animating" principle, underlying the prior exceptions, was to prevent a defendant from using perjury as a defense. James, 123
Ill.2d at 536, 528 N.E.2d at 729. The court reasoned that in preventing the use of
perjury as a defense that "it matters not from whose lips that perjury comes."
Id. Thus the court opined that its new exception in James, although now including all defense witnesses, was consistent with the prior impeachment exceptions. Id.
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'32
prevent "perjury by proxy.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the
Illinois Supreme Court's expansion of the impeachment exception
to the exclusionary rule to include all defense witnesses was improper. 33 The Supreme Court reasoned that this expansion would
have a "chilling effect" on a defendant's ability to present probative
evidence through defense witnesses for fear their testimony would
conflict with the defendant's suppressed statements. 34 In addition,
the Court noted that this expansion would defeat rather than promote the objective of the exclusionary rule which is deterrence of
35
future police misconduct.

The Court's opinion, written by Justice Brennan, 36 initially acknowledged that the discovery of truth was a primary function of
our legal system but added that this truth seeking function must be
limited to protect and promote other important constitutional values. 37 One such important value is the protection of individual pri32. James, 123 Ill. 2d at 536, 528 N.E.2d at 729 (1988). The theory of "perjury by proxy" is that a defendant, bent on presenting perjurious testimony,
will intentionally circumvent the prior impeachment exceptions through the
willful perjury of biased defense witnesses. Id. This testimony, unlike the defendant's own, would be immunized from impeachment with suppressed evidence. Id.; see James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 661 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (dissent accepts "perjury by proxy" theory). But see United States v.
Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (appellate court rejects similar theory of "testimony by proxy").
33. James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 652 (1990).
34. Id. at 653.
35. Id. at 654-55; see, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (when
evaluating proposed exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the Court weighs the
deterrence of.police misconduct against the cost of withholding information
from the truth seeking process).
The question whether the exclusionary rule does, in fact, deter police misconduct is still in dispute. See Oaks, Studying the ExclusionaryRule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970) (exclusionary rule does not significantly deter police misconduct and should be replaced with an effective tort
remedy). But see Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective:
The Struggle to Make the FourthAmendment More Than 'An Empty Blessing,'
62 JUDICATURE 337, 349-50 (1979) (increase in number of search warrants issued
after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), shows rule has deterrent effect); Stewart, supra note 3, at 1395-96 (exclusionary rule does have deterrent effect). For
additional data supporting the rule's deterrent effect see infra note 74.
Another factor examined in evaluating the exclusionary rule is the "cost"
of lost prosecutions due to successful motions to suppress physical evidence,
confessions and identifications. See Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An EmpiricalAssessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585 (in a study
of 7,500 cases, less than 0.6% of cases lost due to successful use of exclusionary
rule); Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on FederalCriminalProsecutions14 (1979) (Rep. No. GGD-7945) (exclusionary rule accounted for only 0.4% of all cases declined for prosecution by United States attorneys). See generally 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, at
§ 1.2.
36. James, 110 S. Ct. at 650 (1990).
37. Id. at 651.
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vacy interests against unreasonable searches and seizures caused by
police misconduct.38 The Court indicated its prior decisions mandated the exclusion of illegally obtained yet probative evidence as a
39
necessary method to deter future police misconduct.
The Court noted this exclusion of illegally obtained evidence,
the exclusionary rule, was not an absolute imperative but rather a
principle forged by a balancing of competing interests: the deterrence of future police misconduct versus the need for probative evidence in the truth seeking process. 40 The Court recognized that
when balancing these competing interests the deterrent effect on
police misconduct is but a "speculative possibility," the scales of jus41
tice swing toward the establishment of exceptions to the rule.
The Court then reviewed its prior impeachment exceptions to the
42
rule and concluded that this balancing approach controlled.
Next, the Court applied this balancing test to the Illinois
Supreme Court's expansion of the impeachment exception in
James.43 .The majority held that this extension of the impeachment
44
exception to include all defense witnesses was impermissible.
This exception, the Court reasoned, would alter both sides of the
balancing test in such a manner as to render the rule inconsistent
45
with its underlying purpose.
The Court noted that the rule's truth seeking function, on one
side of the scale, would not be advanced by this expansion. 46 Enlarging the exception to include all defense witnesses would "chill"
defendants from presenting some or any testimony from defense
witnesses. 47 The Court reasoned that defendants may need to call a
wide range of witnesses to provide probative testimony and that
"hostile" or "reluctant" witnesses may not care whether their testimony "opens the door" to impeachment through suppressed evidence. 48 Furthermore, the Court noted there was no guarantee
that even "friendly" witnesses would not subject themselves to im38. Id.
39. Id. The Court approvingly quoted Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329
(1987), and stated that "[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the
privacy of us all." James, 110 S. Ct. at 651 (quoting Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321, 329 (1987)).
40. James, 110 S. Ct. at 651.
41. Id. (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)).
42. Id. at 651-52.
43. Id. at 652.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 653.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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peachment through their own carelessness. 49 The Court concluded
that a defendant's legitimate fears of inviting impeachment would
stifle the presentation of probative evidence and frustrate the truth
50
seeking function of the trial court.
The Court opined that, on the other side of the scale, this expansion would decisively weaken the deterrent effect of future police misconduct. 5 1 The Court found that defense witnesses are a
much larger group than testifying defendants, thus permitting a
substantially greater use of tainted evidence at trial.5 2 Furthermore, this "chilling effect" would stifle the presentation of defense
witnesses and probative evidence.5 3 The Court concluded that
these two factors would create much more than a "speculative possibility" that police misconduct would aid the prosecution s 4 Therefore, the Court held that a lowering of the deterrent effect on police
on one side, combined with a chilling effect on the truth seeking
function on the other side, rendered this extension to the rule's exceptions impermissible. 55
The United States Supreme Court correctly decided James for
three reasons. First, expanding the impeachment exception to the
exclusionary rule to include all defense witnesses would "chill" a
defendant's ability to offer probative evidence and, quite possibly,
prohibit him from presenting any defense at all. This result drastically limits the application of the exclusionary rule. Second, the
Court correctly analyzed the new exception as a minimal deterrent
on future police misconduct. Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court's
rationale of "perjury by proxy," supporting its new impeachment
exception, is faulty. Current statutory and case law are adequate to
deal with this problem.
The Court's admonition that affirming this new impeachment
exception to the rule would have a "chilling" effect on a defendant's
ability to present probative evidence is understated. Existing exceptions to the rule already permit prosecutors to use suppressed
evidence to impeach a defendant in rebuttal 56 and on cross-exami49. Id.
50. Id. at 654.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 655.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 656. The Court also dismissed the other James rationale of "perjury by proxy." Id. at 653. This theory supposes that the defendant will intentionally circumvent the prior impeachment exceptions through the willful
perjury of third parties. Id. The Court reasoned that a third party's fear of
prosecution for perjury is sufficient to guard against this subterfuge of the truth
seeking process. Id.
56. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 717 (1975) (impeachment of defendant
with suppressed evidence permitted in rebuttal).
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nation where the in court testimony is inconsistent with suppressed
evidence and within the scope of direct examination.5 7 The reasoning supporting these exceptions is that a defendant is free to offer
probative testimony so long as it is consistent with the suppressed
evidence.5 8 However, in reality, the situation is quite different.
Although a defendant has the option of testifying on his own
behalf, he does so at the great risk of testifying inconsistently with
any suppressed evidence. Because the question whether a defendant has testified inconsistently with tainted evidence is difficult to
determine, 59 a defendant may well forego testifying at all for fear of
testifying inconsistently. This is especially true because evidentiary
principles permit considerable latitude in the cross-examination of
an opposing witness. 60 Given this great latitude in questioning, a
prosecutor has little difficulty in eliciting testimony inconsistent
with suppressed evidence.6 1 Therefore, defendants may chose not
to testify at all for fear of the prosecutor's ability to easily introduce
tainted evidence.
An extension of the impeachment exception of the exclusionary rule to include all defense witnesses would create disastrous results. Upon the defense calling any witness, the prosecutor would
possess the power, through her own questions, to introduce suppressed evidence under the guise of impeachment.6 2 This exception
would stifle the truth seeking function because defendants would
be reluctant to call any witnesses for fear of introducing the suppressed evidence. 63 This "chill" to call witnesses denies the trier of
fact probative evidence and effectively limits the use of the exclusionary rule to those instances in which the defendant presents no
defense at all.6 4 Only in this situation would a defendant be certain

57. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627, reh 'g denied, 448 U.S. 911
(1980) (impeachment of defendant with suppressed evidence permitted in crossexamination if within the scope of direct examination).
58. James, 110 S.Ct. at 652-53.
59. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at § 1040 ("[s]uch is the possible variety of
statements that it is often difficult to determine whether this inconsistency
exists").
60. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at §§ 21-24 (evidentiary principles accord parties considerable latitude in cross-examining an opposing witness).
61. See Havens, 446 U.S. at 632 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("even the moderately talented prosecutor [can] 'work in... evidence on cross-examination [as it
would] in its case in chief. ..

.'

To avoid this consequence, a defendant will be

compelled to forgo testifying on his own behalf").
62. See People v. James, 153 Ill. App. 3d 131, 134-35, 505 N.E.2d 1118, 1121
(1987) (new exception would permit the prosecution to introduce any illegally
seized evidence "under the guise of impeachment").
63. See People v. James, 123 Ill. 2d 523, 551, 528 N.E.2d 723, 735 (1988)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (defendant "opens the door" for admission of suppressed
evidence by presenting a witness).
64. James, 110 S.Ct. at 655.
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that the suppressed evidence would be excluded.65 This counterproductive expansion of the impeachment exception creates the sit'66
uation "where the exception swallows up the rule.
Next, the Supreme Court correctly weighed the competing interests in denying the proposed exception to the exclusionary rule.
On the one side, the truth seeking function of the trial court is stifled by the exception's chilling effect on a defendant's ability to offer probative evidence from defense witnesses.6 7 On the other side,
the deterrent effect on future police misconduct would be minimal.
This is true for three reasons.
First, where suppressed evidence is used to impeach all defense
witnesses, the value of this tainted evidence is greatly increased because it could be used more often.68 Thus, it would be advantageous
69
for the prosecution to obtain as much tainted evidence as possible.
70
Second, once sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case
against a person is collected, there is minimal deterrence to keep
police from violating that person's fourth amendment's rights and
seizing additional evidence. Although this tainted evidence cannot
be used in the prosecution's case in chief, it can be used to impeach
any witness the defense calls to testify. 71 Therefore, this exception
would only encourage police to gather additional evidence once the
prima facie case is established thereby creating prosecutorial advantage. 72 Finally, the preceding reasons effectively decrease the
deterrent effect on police if the officers are actually informed about
65. See James, 123 Ill. 2d at 550, 528 N.E.2d at 735 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("a
defendant who puts on a defense thereby waives his fourth amendment right to
the exclusion of suppressed evidence which contradicts his defense") (emphasis
added).
66. James, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 505 N.E.2d at 1121 (quoting People v.
Walls, 42 A.D.2d 575, 577, 344 N.Y.S.2d 435, 437 (1973)).
67. For a discussion of exceptions to the chilling effect see supra note 47
and accompanying text.
68. James, 110 S. Ct. at 655.
69. Id.
70. A case which will prevail unless contradicted and overcome by other
evidence. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wallace, 158 Or. 210, 217, 75 P.2d 942, 947
(Or. 1938).
71. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (suppressed evidence cannot be introduced in the state's case in chief).
72. James, 110 S. Ct. at 655. Justice Stamos warned that the new exception
would encourage rather than deter future police misconduct stating:
But in any case in which police officers can, through lawful means, acquire
enough evidence to make out a case against a suspect, they will be strongly
tempted to secure additional evidence illegally ... [E]ventually the more
ambitious and aggressive policemen and prosecutors, engaged as they are in
the highly competitive business of ferreting out crime, will discover a
handy new tool in their arsenal. I am not so sanguine about human nature
as to believe that they will all be scrupulous enough not to use it.
People v. James, 123 Ill. 2d 523, 553, 528 N.E.2d 723, 736-37 (1988) (Stamos, J.,
dissenting).
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them. Although the Supreme Court's dissent depicts police officers
as being "unschooled in the law, '73 substantial data exists indicating that police officers are apprised of fourth amendment law devel74
opments and that these changes directly influence their behavior.
Therefore, this exception frustrates both the truth seeking function
of the trial court and the deterrent effect on future police
75
misconduct.
The Illinois Supreme Court's rationale of "perjury by proxy" to
substantiate the need for this new impeachment exception to the
exclusionary rule is misplaced. The court's rationale is that a defendant, wanting to introduce perjured testimony but realizing that
his own testimony is open to impeachment by the use of suppressed
evidence, will elicit perjury through his defense witnesses.7 6 In the
present case, the Illinois Supreme Court as well as Justice Kennedy
in his dissent assume, as a premise to this rationale, that Ms. Henderson intentionally testified falsely regarding James' appearance
on the day of the shooting. 77 This assumption is unfounded.7 8 Only
73. James, 110 S. Ct. at 660 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. See Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural'Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 72 (1978) (New
York and Los Angeles police commissioners describe policy changes in response
to adoption of the exclusionary rule); Mertens & Wasserstrum, The Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulatingthe Police and Derailingthe
Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 399-401 (1981) (detailing how Washington, D.C. and Delaware police departments responded to Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979),
by issuing specific new instructions to officers in the field setting forth the rules
established in that case); see also Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing
Health?, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 710-14 (1974) (large increase in number of search warrants issued after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Mertens & Wasserstrum,
supra, at 400, n.174 (describing similar reaction to Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)); Id. at 401, n. 175 (discussing methods F.B.I. director
used for apprising field agents of relevant Supreme Court and court of appeals
fourth amendment decisions).
75. In addition, all other courts which have addressed the question whether
to expand the impeachment exception to include defense witnesses have held
against it. See United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (defendant's suppressed statement cannot be used to impeach psychiatrist's testimony
in support of the affirmative defense of insanity); State v. Hubbard, 103 Wash.
2d 570, 693 P.2d 718 (Wash. 1985) (en banc) (suppressed statements cannot be
used to rebut testimony of witness other than defendant); State v. Kilborn, 143
Vt. 360, 466 A.2d 1175 (Vt. 1983) (suppressed evidence cannot be used to rebut
inferences raised by defense counsel); State v. Burnett, 637 S.W.2d 680 (Mo.
1982) (en banc) (suppressed evidence cannot be used to impeach a witness other
than the defendant); People v. Walls, 42 A.D.2d 575, 344 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1973)
(suppressed statement cannot be used to impeach defense witness).
76. James, 123 Ill. 2d at 538, 528 N.E.2d at 729.
77. See James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 659 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(Henderson's testimony was "known to be untrue"); People v. James, 123 Ill. 2d
at 538, 528 N.E.2d at 729 (James "cannot be allowed to use perjurious testimony
through a biased defense witness").
78. James, 123 Ill. 2d at 547, 528 N.E.2d at 734 (Stamos, J., dissenting). The
record reveals only that a police officer testified as to defendant's statement
concerning his hair color and style and that a friend of the defendant's family
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by giving total credence to the police officer's recollection and veracity while also assuming Ms. Henderson willfully committed perjury can this premise be valid. 79 This reasoning is fallacious.
Assuming, arguendo, that James is a case where perjurious testimony is elicited by the defendant, there are already sufficient
remedies available. First, the prosecutor has criminal sanctions
available to discourage perjury.80 Although the threat of prosecution may not deter a defendant who is already charged with a crime,
the same cannot be said about other defense witnesses, regardless of
their relationship to the defendant. Second, a recent Supreme
Court ruling, Taylor v. Illinois,8 1 potentially provides an alternative
remedy, which could deal with willful perjury at trial.
In Taylor, the Court decided whether a defense counsel's intentional conduct justified the exclusion of a defense witness' testimony.8 2 The trial court had found, via a voir dire hearing, that the
defense counsel had "intentionally" violated local discovery rules.8 3
The Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of the testimony reasoning that exclusion was necessary to maintain "the integrity of the
judicial process itself," which includes the "vital interest in protecting the trial process from the pollution of perjured testimony. '8 4
Therefore, the Court found that a party's intentional misconduct
provided the nexus to offending judicial integrity and mandated exclusion of evidence.
The Taylor reasoning can be interpreted as providing a remedy
for "perjury by proxy". If a trial court finds that a defendant, or his
counsel, has intentionally elicited perjured testimony from a defense witness, a nexus may exist offending judicial integrity, as in
Taylor, and mandate exclusion of the testimony.8 5 Thus, the truth
seeking function of the trial court is protected from intentionally
testified as to defendant's hair style and color and that these two statements
were inconsistent. People v. James, 153 Ill. App. 3d 131, 131-32, 505 N.E. 2d 1118,
1118-19 (1987).
79. James, 110 S.Ct. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80. The prosecutor can charge the defendant with subornation of perjury
and the defense witness with perjury. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1988) (subornation of perjury); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988) (perjury).
81. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
82. Id. at 413.
83. Id. at 405-06.
84. Id. at 417.
85. There are other situations where the Supreme Court has held that willful conduct mandates exclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984) (a police officer's intentional conduct prohibits good faith exception to
warrant requirement); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (an affiant's
willful or reckless inclusion of falsehoods in his affidavit for a search warrant
will mandate exclusion of the fruits of the search if the false statement was
necessary to the finding of probable cause); United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564 (1976) (defendant's perjured statements to a grand jury, although given
without Mirandawarnings, held admissible in subsequent perjury prosecution).
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perjured testimony. This remedy is narrowly tailored to adequately
deal with perjury by proxy without unduly hampering a defendant's ability to present a defense.
In conclusion, the James decision averted the destruction of the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule. Although the Supreme
Court has steadily chipped away at fourth amendment rights by
continually creating exceptions to the rule,8 6 this decision prevents
elimination of the rule's applicability under the guise of fashioning
a "perjury" exception. The Court will undoubtedly continue to create new exceptions to the exclusionary rule and expand the already
existing impeachment exceptions. Furthermore, given the recent
change in the Court's composition, there soon may be no need for
additional exceptions as the future existence of the exclusionary
rule is certainly in question. However, the James decision has kept
the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule alive ... at least for now.
David H. Norris

86. See Comment, The United States Supreme Court's Erosion of Fourth
Amendment Rights: The Trend Continues, 30 S.D.L. REV. 574 (1985) (discussing
the continuous development of exceptions to the exclusionary rule).

